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Abstract
The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed
China as defendant to the US and the EU as claimants, on the somewhat unusual
issue of export restrictions. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various
raw materials of which the country is a major producer create shortages in foreign
markets. This scarcity does not prevail in the Chinese market and the price in the
foreign markets increases, providing a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using
these raw materials. China defends export limitations using Article XX of the GATT
1994 on possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to conserve
natural resources. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the
help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it
on both the domestic and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)’s
framework. The theoretical results focus on the effects of imposing an export quota on
quantities, prices and efficacy, and are used to comment on the claims of the parties
and on the findings of the Panel and Appellate Body. Given the crucial importance
of demand elasticities in this theoretical understanding of the conflict, the empirical
part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the claimants as
well as of China – for each product concerned in the case, defined at the HS6 level.
The empirical results show that among the products concerned in the dispute, two
groups can be differentiated depending on China’s export position. When China is a
major or first exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary effect of an export
quota. When China is a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, there
is evidence coherent with the model according to which China is imposing a quota
export restriction that is inefficient.
Key Words: Export restrictions, WTO, exhaustible natural resources, price discrimina-
tion, Article XX of the GATT 1994.
JEL codes: F130, F180, F510, K330, Q370.
1 Introduction
The China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China - Raw
Materials) dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO, opposed China as defendant to the
US, the EU and Mexico – hereafter the claimants – on a somewhat unusual issue: export
restrictions. This dispute, involving major trade countries, was over four types of export
restrictions – export duties, export quota, export licensing and minimum export prices –
on various raw materials.1 In essence, the dispute raises an important issue: the possibility
to use environmental concerns in order to justify restrictions of the export of exhaustible
natural resources.
The claimants considered that China’s export restrictions on raw materials of which
the country is a major producer, create shortages in foreign markets, which pushes up
prices, while this scarcity does not affect the Chinese market. A higher foreign markets
price gives a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using these raw materials. The
claimants challenged the export restrictions under Article XI of the GATT 1994 prohibiting
quantitative restrictions.2 China defended the export limitations using Article XX of
the GATT 1994 highlighting out possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative
restrictions, for environmental reasons such as the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources (Article XX(g)) and the protection of human health (Article XX(b)). These
types of exceptions are not without limits, however. For example, if discrimination is
proved, resorting to exceptions of Article XX is not sustainable.
The Panel ruled that China’s export restrictions were inconsistent with Article XI of
the GATT 1994. It then found that the general exceptions in Article XX of the GATT
1994 could not be used to justify the constraining measures because the Chinese export
restrictions were deemed discriminatory. Restrictions on exports that are allowed by the
Article XX should be doubled by imposition of corresponding restrictions on domestic
consumption. If this condition is not met, there is discrimination. The Panel stated that
this condition was not met by China.
Trade in natural resources has been the focus of attention in connection with its im-
portance for economic activity, its effect on the environment and its specific international
and domestic regulation (WTO, 2010; Collier and Venables, 2010; Ruta and Venables,
2012; Massari and Ruberti, 2013). This international commercial dispute exemplifies cur-
rent tensions in raw materials markets. In a recent OECD publication, Kim (2010) shows
that the number of countries applying export restrictions has increased since 2000. Most
restrictions apply to raw materials and basic agricultural products. The motives of this
124 raw materials under the category of Bauxite, Coke, Fluorspar, Magnesium, Manganese, Silicone
Carbide, Silicone Metal, Yellow Phosphorus, and Zinc were considered.
2The Chinese export restrictions were also challenged pursuant to Articles VIII and X of the GATT
1994.
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trade policy are various and include the protection of the environment (pollution from
the mining industry and energy consumption), the conservation of natural resources for
future use, the protection of downstream processing industries, the objectives of fiscal re-
ceipts and the control of inflationary pressures. As a result, export restrictions are a fairly
common trade policy in natural resources sectors, while tariff protection is less developed
than in other sectors as shown by Latina et al. (2011). Korinek and Kim (2011), study-
ing the presence and impacts of export restrictions on raw materials, question the idea
that export restrictions are the most effective tool to achieve environmental goals showing
that, in many cases, these restrictions do not lead to a consistent reduction in production.
Raw materials as well as rare earths are increasingly the subjects of trade disputes and,
given the characteristic of exhaustibility of these resources and their key position in high
technology production, will continue to figure in such disputes.3
This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the China - Raw Materials dispute along
with an estimation of the import demand elasticity of the claimants as well as China.4 We
model a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic
and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)’s framework. This theoretical
analysis allows discussion of the economic rationales of the arguments of the parties in the
dispute. The effects of export restrictions on prices and natural resources extraction are
investigated with the aim of characterizing the context in which the parties’ arguments
are corroborated. The theoretical analysis provides a context for discussing discrimination
from a different point of view to that of the Panel, that focuses on price distortion and
the consequences for societal wellbeing. In the dispute, discrimination was recognized
based on the asymmetric treatment of domestic and foreign raw materials markets by
China’s trade policy. Hudec (2003) points out that isolating differential treatment is a
first step in investigating discrimination; in order to conclude about discrimination, a
second step is needed to show that something is “wrong” in the differential treatment.
Interestingly, one of the results of the model is to show that differential treatment of
domestic and foreign markets implied by export restrictions increases price distortions
only under certain circumstances. In some situations price distortion is reduced, with the
result that nothing “wrong” attaches to the natural resources export restrictions.
A better understanding of the conflict from a theoretical perspective is achieved by
making the discussion of the parties’ arguments and the effect of export restrictions on
price distortion dependent on comparison of the price elasticities of domestic and foreign
demand. Because of the crucial importance of demand elasticities, the empirical part of
the paper provides estimates of the import demand elasticity of the claimants, – the US,
3Raw materials are involved in numerous high-technology components of production. For instance,
silicon, used for the production of solar panels, is a main raw material in the photovoltaic industry.
4The dispute is analysed from a legal point of view in Karapinar (2012).
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the EU27 and Mexico–, as well as of China, for each product concerned in the case defined
at the 6 digit International Trade Classification level. The estimates are based on the
methodology in Hauk (2008) using Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995) panel data techniques to account for endogeneity problems. Among other results,
the empirical part of the paper shows that two cases should be considered. In the first,
China is a major exporter and does not discriminate according to demand elasticity and
there is no evidence of a quota effect on prices. In the second, China is a weak exporter
although a major producer and in this case, the estimates support the existence of a quota
distortion in a monopoly pricing behaviour.
The paper is organized as following. The theoretical model is developed in Section
2. Section 3 develops the empirical investigation and Section 4 provides a concluding
discussion of the case.
2 Monopoly, resources extraction, and export quota
Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) examine the case where a monopolist exploits an ex-
haustible resource and sells it on two different markets. The model retains the features
of Stiglitz (1976) model with iso-elastic demand and zero extraction costs. Under these
assumptions and in presence of two markets where arbitrage is not possible, the authors
compare the results found in the cases of the monopolist maximizing its profit, and the
social planner maximizing total welfare. They find that the monopolist exploits the differ-
ence in demand characteristics and sells at two different prices whereas the social planner
fixes the same price on both markets in order to signal equivalent scarcity cost. In terms of
quantities, they show that the monopolist extracts more rapidly than the social planner.
2.1 A model of natural resources extraction and export
In order to develop a theoretical analysis of China – Raw Materials dispute we introduce in
Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)’s model a trade policy aimed at restricting the exports
of an exhaustible natural resource. We then consider that the resource extracted by the
monopolist is sold on two markets: the domestic and the foreign. The aim of the model
is to emphasize the consequences of an export restriction consisting of a quota on: the
quantity sold overseas; the price; the resource extraction path; and welfare. Three different
scenarios are considered: (i) [P ], a social planner maximizes total welfare j = P ; (ii) [M ],
a monopolist maximizes its profit j = M ; and (iii) [E] a monopolist maximizes its profit
while it is constrained by an export quota j = E.
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2.1.1 Assumptions for the three scenarios
The three scenarios have the following features in common. The domestic and foreign
markets are denoted respectively d and f . In these markets, the two demands have different
price elasticities ηd and ηf . For simplicity, we suppose – following Stiglitz (1976) – that
both elasticities are constant and greater than 1 and that there are no extraction costs.
The constant discount rate is denoted r. Demand is given by:
qji (t) =
µi
pji (t)
ηi
∀j = P, M, E ∀i = d, f (1)
where µi is the relative size of the market i. The inverse demand functions are then:
pji (t) =
(
qji (t)
µi
)−1
ηi
∀i = d, f ∀j = P, M, E (2)
The extraction rate at time t is qj (t) and is split into: qjd (t) the amount of the resource
offered on the domestic market and qjf (t) the amount of the resource offered on the foreign
market:
qj (t) = qjd (t) + q
j
f (t) ∀t, ∀j = P, M, E (3)
The resource reserve S is known with certainty at time 0. The constraint on total
extraction is such that:
∫ ∞
t=0
[
qjd(t) + q
j
f (t)
]
dt ≤ S ∀j = P, M, E (4)
When an export quota is introduced in the monopolist’s decision problem (j = E), the
total resource extraction dedicated to the foreign market is limited to Sw:5∫ ∞
t=0
qEf (t)dt ≤ Sf (5)
2.1.2 Three decision problems
The social planner is supposed to maximize the total surplus which is equal to the total
consumer surplus since there is no extraction cost. The social planner’s maximization
problem is thus:
max
qPd (t),q
P
f (t)
∫∞
0 e
−rt
[∫
pPd (t) +
∫
pPf (t)
]
dt
s.t.
∫∞
0
[
qPd (t) + q
P
f (t)
]
dt ≤ S
[P ]
The monopolist aims at maximizing its profits under the resource stock constraint:
5Therefore, the monopolist has to choose how to allocate Sw over time.
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max
qMd (t),q
M
f (t)
∫∞
0 e
−rt
[
pMd (t) q
M
d (t) + p
M
f (t) q
M
f (t)
]
dt
s.t.
∫∞
0
[
qMd (t) + q
M
f (t)
]
dt ≤ S
[M ]
The decision problem of the monopolist facing the export quota is:
max
qEd (t),q
E
f (t)
∫∞
0 e
−rt
[
pEd (t) q
E
d (t) + p
E
f (t) q
E
f (t)
]
dt
s.t.
∫∞
0
[
qEd (t) + q
E
f (t)
]
dt ≤ S
and
∫∞
0 q
E
f (t) dt ≤ Sf
[E]
2.2 The consequences of an export quota
While Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) focused on decision problems [P ] and [M ] to study
the behaviour of a monopolist extracting an exhaustible natural resource and selling it on
two different markets, here we focus on problem [E] to study the impact of an export
quota on the monopolist’s behaviour.
Replacing the price functions by their expressions given in (2) allows the first order
conditions of the maximization of the monopolist’s profit under the total extraction and
the quota conditions to be written as:
e−rt · ηd − 1
ηd
·
(
qEd (t)
µd
)−1
ηd − λ1 = 0 (6)
e−rt · ηf − 1
ηf
·
(
qEf (t)
µf
)−1
ηf
− λ1 − λ2 = 0 (7)∫ ∞
t=0
[
qEd (t) + q
E
f (t)
]
dt ≤ S (λ1 > 0) (8)∫ ∞
t=0
qEf (t)dt ≤ Sf (λ2 > 0) (9)
Both extractions conditions must hold along the resource extraction paths for both
markets.6 In the rest of the paper we consider the two constraints to be binding in order
to concentrate on the Chinese claim that natural resource scarcity matters, and on the
claimants’ concern over export restrictions.
2.2.1 The rate of growth of prices and the extraction paths
A first characteristic common to the solutions of the maximization problems [P ], [M ], and
[E] is that prices are rising at the interest rate, as stated in Lemma (1).
6To satisfy the first order conditions the two quantities extracted must be strictly positive in every
period (even if infinitesimally small).
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Lemma (1). Under the three decision problems [P ], [M ], and [E], the prices
in both markets are rising over time at the discount interest rate:
pji (t) = e
rtpji (0) ∀i = d, f ∀j = P, M, E (10)
Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) showed this result under decision problems [P ] and
[M ]. The proof under problem [E] is given in the annex. The extraction paths (from
Hotelling rules) for the domestic and foreign markets can be calculated as the dual result
of the price paths as follows:
qji (t) = e
−ηirtqji (0) i = d, f ∀j = P, M, E (11)
Extraction paths have the same form under the three decision problems [P ], [M ], and
[E]. Note, however, that as relative prices differ under the three problems, the extraction
paths will diverge.
2.2.2 The impact of constraining exports on prices
Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) show that the social planner equates the two prices in
order to reflect equivalent scarcity costs on both markets. But, since demand functions
differ in their elasticities and market size parameters, the optimal quantity chosen by the
social planner for each market will differ. Using (2) and price equality on both markets
under [P ], we find a relationship between qPf (t) and q
P
d (t):
qPf (t) = µf
(
qPd (t)
µd
) ηf
ηd
(12)
Unlike the social planner, the monopolist has an incentive to discriminate conditional
on demand elasticities: i.e. to fix a higher price in the lowest demand elasticity market.
The profit-maximizing monopolist equates each market’s marginal revenue. It follows the
relation between the two prices under [M ]:
pMf (t) =
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
· pMd (t) (13)
If the domestic demand price elasticity ηd is higher than the foreign demand price
elasticity ηf , then pMf (t) is higher than p
M
d (t). And symmetrically, when ηd < ηf , then
pMf (t) < p
M
d (t).
The introduction of an export quota in the monopolist’s decision problem modifies
these results: an export quota can push the foreign price above the domestic price, even
if the domestic demand elasticity is smaller than the foreign demand elasticity, provided
the export quota is sufficiently restrictive.
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Lemma (2). When the profit maximization is subject to an export quota
constraint, the monopolist chooses extractions qEd (t) and q
E
f (t) such that:
pEf (t) =
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
· pEd (t) + λ2ert
ηf
ηf − 1 (14)
The proof is provided in the annex. If the export quota constraint is not binding
(λ2 = 0), (14) and (13) are identical and, as a consequence, the results found by Fischer
and Laxminarayan (2004) apply: the monopolist charges a higher price in the market with
the lowest demand elasticity. When the export quota is binding (λ2 > 0), two cases are
possible depending on the relative size of both demand elasticities.
First, if domestic demand elasticity is larger than foreign demand elasticity (ηd > ηf ),
then pMf (t) > p
M
d (t), because λ2e
rt ηf
ηf−1 > 0. Then, when ηd > ηf , p
M
f (t) > p
M
d (t) holds
irrespective of the presence of an export quota.
Second, if domestic demand elasticity is smaller than foreign demand elasticity (ηd <
ηf ), the monopolist facing an export quota may charge a higher price in foreign market.
This outcome is addressed in two steps. First Proposition (1) shows that the effect of
an export quota is to raise the price on the foreign market and to lower the price on the
domestic market. Then, Proposition (2) establishes a condition under which the foreign
price is higher than the domestic price even if the foreign demand elasticity is greater than
domestic demand elasticity.
Proposition (1). Constraining the monopolist’s export through a quota raises
the price on the foreign market and lowers the price on the domestic market:
pEf (t) > p
M
f (t) and p
E
d (t) < p
M
d (t).
The proof is given in annex. The price effect of an export quota is independent of
the level of the relative demand elasticities and has implications for consumers’ welfare as
stated in Corollary (1).
Corollary (1). Consumers in the foreign market (resp. the domestic market)
suffer (resp. benefit) from the export quota.
This result, whose proof is given in annex, follows Proposition (1).
The possibility of a higher foreign than domestic price one as a consequence of export
restrictions (pEf (t) > p
E
d (t)) when ηd < ηf , can now be stated.
Proposition (2). Under an export quota, if the export quota constraint is
sufficiently constraining, the monopolist can fix a foreign price higher than
the domestic price for the exhaustible resource even if foreign demand price
elasticity is greater than the domestic demand elasticity. This requires that
the initial extraction for export is small enough:
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qEf (0) < µf
(
qEd (0)
µd
) ηf
ηd
(15)
The proof is given in the annex. In a situation where the foreign demand elasticity
is higher than the domestic demand elasticity, the monopolist without export restriction
would choose a foreign price lower than the domestic price. Imposing an export quota can
push the foreign price above the domestic price if the quota is sufficiently restrictive. This
situation appears if condition (15) is satisfied, implying that qEf (0) the initial resource
extraction for export is sufficiently small.
Proposition (2) shows that, as asserted by the claimants, an export quota could lead to
an implicit cost advantage for the Chinese producers because it might induce an increase in
the foreign price relative to the domestic price that is not related to an elasticity difference.
In the context of China - Raw Materials, condition (15) shows that this charge against
China is reasonable only if the export quota is sufficiently restrictive.
2.2.3 The impact of constraining exports on the monopolist equilibrium dis-
tortion
We can compare the prices fixed by the social planer and the monopolist with and without
export quota. Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) show that the monopolist’s equilibrium
must be at a higher price than is optimal in the market with the lowest demand elasticity,
and at a lower price than the optimal in the market with the highest demand elasticity.
Two situations can therefore be considered. The first is pMf (t) > p
P (t) > pMd (t)), which
arises when ηf < ηd; the second one is pMd (t) > p
P (t) > pMf (t), which arises when ηf > ηd.
Propositions (1) and (2) taken together show that the effect of the export quota is to raise
the price on the foreign market and to lower the price on the domestic market, and that
the price on the foreign market might be higher than the price on the domestic market
even if ηf > ηd (when condition (15) is satisfied). These results have implications for price
distortion in the monopolist’s equilibrium as shown in Proposition (3) and Corollary (2).
Proposition (3). When domestic demand elasticity is greater than foreign
demand elasticity, the export quota increases the inefficiency of the monopoly.
When, foreign demand elasticity is greater than domestic demand elasticity,
imposing an export quota increases the inefficiency of the monopoly if pEf (t) is
sufficiently larger than pMf (t) and p
E
d (t) sufficiently smaller than p
M
d (t), satis-
fying the following conditions:
pEf (t) > p
M
f (t) · ηf−1ηf ·
ηd
ηd−1
pEd (t) < p
M
d (t) · ηfηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
(16)
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The proof is given in the annex. Four cases are considered in relation to Proposition
(3). In the first situation the monopolist without export quota fixes a higher price on the
foreign market because ηf < ηd. In this case (depicted in figure 1.a), the quota increases
the inefficiency of the monopolist’s equilibrium because of the increase in pMf (t) and the
decrease in pMd (t) it implies: p
E
d (t) < p
M
d (t) < p
P (t) < pMf (t) < p
E
f (t).
pPpMd pMf
 
 
ηd > ηf
pP pMdpMf pP pMdpMf
ηf > ηd ηf > ηd
Condition (15) satisfied Conditions (15) and (16) satisfied
 
 
 
 
(a) (c) (d)
pP pMdpMf
ηf > ηd
Conditions (15) and (16) not satisfied
 
 
(b)
The second situation, corresponding to ηf > ηd, includes three sub-cases, since, as
shown in the proof of proposition (3), conditions (16) imply that condition (15) is satisfied,
but the converse is not true. In the first sub-case corresponding to figure (1.b) conditions
(15) and (16) are not satisfied. In that case the increase in the foreign price and the
decrease in the domestic price implied by the export quota are not big enough to result
in pEd (t) < p
E
f (t). The effect of the export quota, therefore, is to move the two prices
closer to the price chosen by the regulator: pMf (t) < p
E
f (t) < p
P (t) < pEd (t) < p
M
d (t)
and, as a result, to reduce price discrimination. In the second sub-case corresponding
to figure (1.c) condition (15) is satisfied whereas conditions (16) are not. In this case
the effect of the quota is to push the foreign price above the domestic price. However,
pMf (t) < p
E
d (t) and p
E
f (t) < p
M
d (t) so that the monopolist’s equilibrium price distortion is
reduced as a consequence of the export quota. In the last sub-case corresponding to figure
(1.d), condition (15) and conditions (16) are satisfied. The foreign price is higher than the
domestic price and the increase in the former and the decrease in the latter are sufficiently
large to amplify the monopolist’s equilibrium price distortion: pEd (t) < p
M
f (t) < p
P (t) <
pMd (t) < p
E
f (t).
Finally, we can note with Corollary (2) that when the monopolist’s equilibrium price
distortion is reduced, the monopolist does not set prices equal to those of the social planner.
Corollary (2). When imposing a quota reduces the monopolist’s equilibrium
price distortion, optimality is not restored.
The proof is given in the annex. Proposition (3) is especially important in the context
of the China - Raw Materials dispute since it deals with discrimination. Discrimination
was recognized in this dispute through the simple asymmetric treatment by China’s trade
policy of the domestic and the foreign markets. When the consequences of this differ-
ential treatment are fully appreciated based on examination of the price distortion (and,
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therefore, welfare), Proposition (3) shows that the differential treatment of domestic and
foreign demand using an export quota should not be seen automatically as augmenting
price distortion in the context of a monopoly and, on the contrary, might reduce it.
2.2.4 The impact of export quota on the resource total initial extraction
Should the export quota, in any cases, be considered a resource conserving policy? To
answer this question, we first characterize the initial extractions qEd (0) and q
E
f (0). Then,
we compare the total extraction in the initial period under [M ] and under [E] in order
to appreciate the consequences of the export quota on the conservation of the natural
resource.
Integrating over time qji (t) given in the extractions paths (11) for i = d, f and j =
P, M, E gives:
∫ ∞
t=0
qji (t) dt =
qji (0)
rηi
∀i = d, f ∀j = P, M, E (17)
The constraint on total extraction (4) under each decision problem can thus be written
as:
qjd(0)
rηd
+
qjf (0)
rηf
≤ S ∀j = P, M, E
The initial extraction in d in terms of that in f , when the constraint is binding, can
thus be expressed as:
qjd(0) = rηdS −
ηd
ηf
qjf (0) ∀j = P, M, E (18)
The total initial extraction Qj0 = q
j
d(0) + q
j
f (0) is therefore:
Qj0 = rηdS +
(
1− ηd
ηf
)
qjf (0) ∀j = P, M, E (19)
The introduction of
∫∞
t=0 q
E
d (t) dt and
∫∞
t=0 q
E
f (t) dt calculated in (16) under [E] in the
first order conditions (8) and (9) (with λ1 and λ2 > 0) solve the optimal initial extractions:
qEf (0)
rηf
= Sf ⇔ qEf (0) = rηf · Sf (20)
qEd (0) = rηd(S − Sf ) (21)
The total initial extractions under [E] and [M ] can be compared in order to capture
the implications of the export quota on both the initial total extraction and the rate of
depletion of the resource. The results depend on the relative size of the two demand
elasticities as presented in proposition (4) and Corollary (3).
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Proposition (4): Imposing an export quota increases (decreases) the initial
total extraction if the domestic demand elasticity is larger (smaller) than the
foreign demand elasticity.
When ηd > ηf the net effect on the total initial supply, of imposing a quota, is positive.
This result is similar to the result in Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) who compare the
total initial extractions under [P ] and [M ]: the increase in the supply on the market with
more elastic demand overcomes the decrease in the supply on the market with less elastic
demand. This effect is reinforced when the monopolist is constrained by an export quota.
The difference in the total initial extraction QE0 −QM0 is negative when ηf > ηd. The
net effect of imposing an export quota on the total initial supply is negative. The fact
that the contraction of supply (and the rise in the price) appears on the market with
more elastic demand and that the rise in supply appears on the market with less elastic
demand, implies that the net effect is reduction in the total initial supply. These results
have consequences for the rates of resource extraction as shown with Corollary (3).
Corollary (3). Imposing an export quota implies that the monopolist extracts
more (less) rapidly if domestic demand elasticity is bigger (smaller) than foreign
demand elasticity.
The proof of Corollary (3) uses the result of proposition (4), showing that imposing
an export quota increases the initial extraction when ηd > ηf and decreases it otherwise,
and the result of Lemma (1), showing that resource extractions under [M ] and [E] grow
over time at the interest rate. Note that since the first order conditions (6)-(9) must hold
along the extraction path, if domestic demand elasticity is bigger than foreign demand
elasticity, the monopolist under an export quota constraint initially extracts more than
it would were there no export quota, but cannot do this indefinitely. The total stock
constraint implies that at some point the extraction path under [E] crosses the extraction
path under [M ].
Proposition (4) and Corollary (3) propose important results to interpret the China -
Raw Materials dispute. First, China’s defence of imposing export restrictions as a resource
conservation policy is acceptable only when domestic demand elasticity is smaller than
foreign demand elasticity. Second, in this case, asking for a restriction on the domestic
consumption of the resource, as the Panel did, is useless. However, it should be required
when domestic demand elasticity is bigger than foreign demand elasticity.
We turn now to an attempt to bring this model to the data in order to cast new light
on the empirical evidence.
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3 Empirical analysis
Any empirical attempt to grasp the effect of the Chinese export restrictions on prices by
identifying two periods, before and after implementation of the export quota, is extremely
challenging. Indeed, the dispute addresses four types of policy implying 40 measures.
Also, for the most part, the measures are decided annually and renewed over time, while
the trade policy duration is unclear. The fact that some of the restrictions were allowed
to a certain extent in China’s accession to the WTO protocol, shows that the raw ma-
terials export restrictions may have always been in place. However, given the theoretical
understanding of the China - Raw Materials dispute developed in Section 2, we have
some directions for assessing China’s trade policy with regard to China’s motives and the
claimants’ charges. The model states that foreign and domestic demand elasticities, ηd
and ηf , are of the utmost importance as are the differences in foreign and domestic prices.
The claimants feared an increase in the price of strategic imported raw materials above the
Chinese domestic price, which would create unfair competitive advantage.7 However, the
model shows that differences in price have to be judged considering differences in demand
elasticities. The WTO Panel found evidence of discrimination since the export restrictions
were not accompanied by restrictions on domestic demand, but the model specifies that
parallel restrictions are required only if domestic demand elasticity is larger than foreign
demand elasticity. The model shows also that the Chinese argument of resource conser-
vation is admissible in a certain configuration of demand elasticities (i.e. when domestic
demand is less elastic than foreign demand). Estimating demand elasticities, therefore,
should shed light on the dispute from an empirical point of view. To carry out this empir-
ical work, in a first step, we describe the quantity and prices of the trade flows concerned
in the dispute, and in a second step, estimate claimants’ and China’s import demand
elasticities.
3.1 Quantity and price: An appraisal
3.1.1 Quantities at stake
The China - Raw materials dispute covers a small (24) number of products that we refer to
as “products under conflict” (hereafter PUC ). The 24 raw materials products are defined
at the finest level of aggregation (8 digits) of the Harmonized System (HS) classification.
The most detailed level of aggregation available in the trade database that we use – BACI-
CEPII from UN trade database – is 6 digits. This a lower level than is used by the WTO,
but, for most products, provides a sufficient level of aggregation because the products are
7Recall that the claimants are countries that are opposed to China (EU27, US and Mexico).
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mostly homogeneous and aggregation levels 6 and 8 generally overlap.8 Our final group
of raw material numbers 21 products because three HS6 products (Coke, 270400; Zinc,
790112; Manganese, 811100) are split across several HS8 under-classes.9
To isolate some specific characteristics of the PUC products with regard to trade policy,
we consider a larger group of products including PUC. Specifically, we retain all products
at the 6-digit level (HS6) included in the six HS2-classes of products that includes the
PUC products. We refer to this group of products as HS2 PUC.10 The HS2 PUC group
includes 388 products defined at the HS6 level, including the 21 PUC products.
Table 1: Country Share in percentage of HS2 PUC World Import – Average over 1995-2009
HS2 Name Claimants China USA France Germany Japan
25 SALT and SULPHUR 49 4 10 4 6 6
26 ORES, SLAG AND ASH 37 17 5 3 7 19
27 MINERAL FUELS and OILS 49 3 17 4 5 10
28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS 50 4 14 6 6 7
79 ZINC 58 6 17 5 9 2
81 OTHER BASE METALS 58 3 16 5 9 12
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2009.
Table 1 presents the total share of world imports of the claimants, of China and of
the individual main claimants for the different HS2 PUC groups. It shows that world
imports are dominated by the group of claimant countries of which the US is the larger
contributor, while China is a large importer of “Ores, Slag and Ash”. Although China is
considered the main producer of PUC products, it also imports all of them.11
The short names of the PUC products and their percentages in total world imports
are provided in Table 2.12 It unveils that the claimants are the main world importers of
PUC products. It is also remarkable that China is still a major world importer at this
finer product level. This import activity allows us to estimate an import elasticity for
China that can be used to proxy for Chinese domestic demand elasticity.
Of course, these raw materials products represent a very small share of the total
imports of both the claimants and China.13 However, as highlighted in the introduction,
8This is the highest disaggregated level of import elasticity estimates computed so far, see e.g. Kee
et al. (2008).
9Coke, 270400 = 27040019 + 27040019 + 27040030 + 27040090; Zinc, 790112 = 79011210 + 79011230 +
79011290; Manganese, 811100 = 81110011 + 81110090.
10The full name of each of HS2 PUC product is provided in Appendix Table B.1.
11In the growing South-South trade, China is a large importer of raw materials because of its special-
ization pattern and fast growth. See Hanson (2012) and Roberts and Rush (2012).
12Full names are provided in the Appendix.
13See Appendix Table B.2 and B.3.
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Table 2: Country Share in percentage of HS6-PUC World Import – Average over 1995-2009
Claimants China USA France Germany Japan
250830 Fireclay 62.9 1.2 5.4 1.5 1.9 1.7
252921 Fluorspar< 97%a 41.1 0.7 9.9 1.0 4.4 16.0
252922 Fluorspar> 97%a 64.6 0.1 28.7 0.5 14.4 13.2
260200 Manganese ore 28.0 24.1 4.6 8.0 0.5 13.8
260600 Aluminium 62.5 4.5 23.7 4.8 6.5 3.8
260800 Zinc ores 53.4 6.6 1.9 5.5 4.5 10.4
262019 Slag with zinc 72.9 0.9 7.1 8.4 4.5 5.2
262040 Slag with aluminium 75.3 6.7 10.5 2.5 24.5 3.1
270400 Coke 56.7 0.1 10.1 4.8 15.9 6.0
280469 Silicon 55.8 1.3 15.0 2.3 14.0 19.8
280470 Phosphorus 41.8 0.1 4.6 1.8 13.0 12.0
281700 Zinc oxide & peroxide 63.5 3.7 15.5 5.1 6.0 3.8
284920 Carbides of Silicon 61.3 0.6 18.7 5.0 11.8 13.2
790111 Unwrought zinc> 99%a 59.4 4.0 22.6 2.1 7.3 2.3
790112 Unwrought zinc< 99%a 62.6 1.9 20.6 6.9 6.5 1.3
790120 Unwrought Zinc alloys 46.0 13.2 1.7 6.0 11.0 1.0
790200 Zinc waste 45.3 21.8 5.7 3.1 6.1 0.6
810411 Magnesium> 99%a 54.0 0.0 14.6 4.0 8.4 12.7
810419 Magnesium< 99%a 74.0 0.3 27.6 2.3 12.6 6.3
810420 Magnesium Waste 58.5 1.3 25.1 1.0 7.1 0.5
811100 Manganese dust & powder 51.5 0.3 9.7 4.9 12.5 20.6
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2009.
a Means % of purity.
14
their contribution in production is very important.
China can be considered a monopolist if it has the highest share of world export. This
applies to some of the PUC products. Most often, there is a large number of exporters of
each PUC product, but restricting this to the leading 20 exporters accounts for more than
90% of world export. Appendix Table B.4 presents the share of the five biggest exporters
of PUC products in 1995-2009. China is among the top 5 for 12 of the 21 PUC products,
and is the main world exporter for 8 PUC products (see Table 3).
Table 3: PUC Products for which China is the First World Exporter and Corresponding
Share of World Export in percentages – 1995-2009
HS6 Name Share
252921 Fluorspar< 97% 26
252922 Fluorspar> 97% 52
270400 Coke 36
280469 Silicon 29
280470 Phosphorus 29
284920 Carbides of Silicon 45
810411 Magnesium> 99% 24
811100 Manganese dust & powder 51
3.1.2 Unit Value as Price
Before embarking on the econometric part, we analyse prices proxied by unit values. The
analysis is centred on imports from the claimants. Table 4 gives an average unit value
for all import flows of each product, as well as the annual average growth rate of unit
value. Table 4 Column (1) displays the arithmetic average export unit value of the five
first exporters (4 if China is among the first 5); Column (2) gives the same statistic for
Chinese export only.14 This unable comparison of Chinese prices with the average prices
of other large exporters of the same product over the period. Chinese export prices are
below the mean of the four (or 5) first exporters for 14 HS6 products and above the mean
for the remaining 7. This means that, for two thirds of PUC, Chinese exporters have a
competitive advantage relative to the main exporters.
Table 4 Columns (3) to (6) display weighted indexes. In order to proxy what the
Chinese really obtain from their export, we compute a weighted unit value index where
export weights are the share of each destination (import country) in Chinese total HS6
export. To assess what the Chinese pay for their import, we compute a weighted unit
14The 5 largest exporters of PUC products account for nearly 70% of PUC trade in 1995-2009. Appendix
Table B.4 presents the names and shares of the first five exporters per HS6 product.
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value where import weights are the shares of each country of origin in China’s total HS6
imports. The weighted Chinese export unit value per product is used as a proxy for foreign
price pˆf . Foreigners are the claimants and pˆf gives an index of what the claimants as a
whole paid for imports from China. The weighted Chinese import unit value per product
is used to proxy for the Chinese domestic price, pˆd. We suppose that China imports similar
products from abroad to those it produces at home. This is reasonable if we accept the
hypothesis of homogenous products at the 6-digit level of aggregation. It is also coherent
with our estimate of Chinese demand elasticity based on import demand elasticity, as
described below.
Comparisons of pˆf and pˆd show that most of the time foreign/export price is lower
than domestic/import price – 13 products over 21. Nearly two thirds of products are such
that China experiences unfavourable terms of trade. It imports at a higher price than it
exports for 13 products. There are 8 products for which the contrary is happening.
The annual average growth rates displayed in Table 4 are nearly always positive. There
are a few products where prices decreased. Among the 21 products, 10 show a higher
increases for import prices than export prices. This suggests support for Proposition (1)
for half (11) PUC products: Chinese domestic prices decrease whereas the prices paid by
foreigners increase.15
The first row in Table 4 gives the results for the PUC aggregate: (i) China’s PUC
export price is lower than the average price for the other main exporters, thus China has
a competitive advantage (this is also true if we drop product 280470 which behaves as
an outlier); (ii) China imports at a higher price than it exports, and we can deduce that
China’s PUC domestic price is higher than the export price; (iii) the annual average growth
rates of Chinese domestic and export price are positive and equivalent. To interpret these
observations on prices with respect to trade policy, we need to estimate demand elasticities.
3.2 Import demand elasticities
3.2.1 Estimation Methodology
We extend Hauk (2008)’s methodology for estimating import demand elasticities. This
method accounts for endogeneity problems by using Arellano and Bond’s difference Gen-
eral Method of Moments (GMM) panel data techniques. Here, we use an augmented
GMM system based on Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) where
the addition of lagged variables instruments allows more efficient estimates.
For the import demand of claimants (as an aggregate) and China, estimation of demand
price elasticity is based on the following equation:
15However, it is likely that other demand and supply shocks caused the changes in prices during the
period. It is not possible here to isolate trade policy shocks.
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Table 4: Mean and Annual Average Growth of unit value per product – 1995-2009
PUC-HS6 f EXPORT UV CHINESE WEIGHTED UVb
First FIVEa CHINA EXPORT IMPORT
pˆf AGR 95-09 pˆd AGR 95-09
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PUC 4.50 3.31 1.61 0.07 8.03 0.07
250830 0.77 0.81 0.33 0.22 0.50 0.04
252921 0.77 0.33 0.16 0.08 0.46 0.02c
252922 0.16 11.37 0.79 0.07 2.82 0.15c
260200 0.43 1.84 0.51 0.12 0.23 0.34
260600 0.93 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.52 0.07
260800e 4.34 3.38 4.62 0.23 4.11 -0.32
262019e 3.92 2.90 2.89 0.06c 6.52 0.20
262040 2.58 1.76 0.48 -0.09 0.69 0.18
270400 0.30 0.47 0.31 0.12 0.58 -0.02
280469 5.68 2.10 1.24 0.05 22.20 0.20
280470 34.22 11.92 2.93 0.08 96.64 0.13
281700 2.25 1.63 1.42 0.08 1.23 0.04
284920 8.95 2.72 0.82 0.01 3.58 0.05
790111e 2.40 2.19 1.54 0.04 1.30 0.03
790112e 1.64 3.39 1.91 0.10 1.25 0.05
790120e 3.73 7.56 3.15 0.03 1.27 0.06
790200e 1.34 2.95 1.89 0.12d 1.24 0.06
810411 5.32 3.54 2.56 -0.01 5.49 0.00
810419 8.23 3.66 2.52 0.01 7.75 0.01c
810420 3.91 2.27 1.93 0.02 1.41 0.01c
811100 2.69 2.52 1.73 0.04 8.93 0.09
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2009. Unit value in thousand dollars per ton.
a Average of the first five exporters or first four if China is one of them.
b Import Weights are shares of each country of origin in Chinese total HS6 import. Ex-
port weights are share of each importers in Chinese total HS6 export.
c Average annual growth rate over 1997-2009 d 1997-2006, no export from 2007 up to
2009. e Very few flows from China over the total period.
f Bold HS6 numbers are products for which China is first exporter.
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log qi,j,t = ai,0 + ai,1 log qi,j,t−1 + ai,2 log pi,j,t +A′iXi,j,t + i,j,t (22)
where qi,j,t is the quantity of good i imported from country j at time t, pi,j,t is the
price of the imported good i, ai,1 is the import price elasticity for the good i, and i,j,t
is an error term. A vector of the covariates is also included which takes account of the
average price of imported goods from other countries in the same sector-HS6 product and
the real GDP of the importing country. To account for possible rigidities in response to
market changes, a lagged value of the quantity of the good imported is added.
Estimation of elasticity is affected by an endogenous bias because quantity and price
are both causing one another. Also, by introducing the lagged value of the imported
quantity, we introduce a dynamic effect – here a persistence effect – but we also introduce
an element of correlation with the error term. All this renders the OLS estimator biased
and inconsistent. We use system GMM estimators proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998)
to deal with the panel structure as well as the endogeneity bias.
First, we estimate Equation (22) on the 388 HS2-PUC products and then on the 21
PUC products only. This provides an aggregate estimate of elasticity to be compared
with the first row of Table 4. Then we replicate Equation (22) for each of the 21 PUC
and discuss the results for the 21 demand elasticity estimates with respect to the prices
proxies in Table 4. These regressions are processed using the panel structure of the data in
which the cross-section dimension is the origin of the import, i.e. the different exporting
countries.
3.2.2 Results
We start by considering PUC products as an aggregate item that we want to compare
with a larger aggregate of raw materials based on HS2 PUC. We turn next to the estimate
per PUC product.
Aggregate Estimates: Table 5 gives the results of the estimation of Equation (22)
on all HS2-PUC and on only PUC products. Elasticities are given by the coefficient of
unit value. Columns (1) and (3) provide the estimates of the elasticity when import is an
aggregated flow of the 388 HS2-PUC products per country of origin and per year; columns
(2) and (4) give the estimates of the elasticity when import is an aggregated flow of the
21 PUC products.
All price elasticity estimates are negative and significant. On average a 10% rise in
price leads to a 7 to 11% decrease in import quantity depending on the country and the
group of products.
Comparison of HS2 and HS6 estimates for Claimants tells us whether “to be a product
under conflict” has an impact on price elasticity. The results show a clear larger sensitivity
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for PUC products compared to the whole group of HS2 products. This result is not
observed for China. Chinese import price elasticity is not significantly different between
PUC products and HS2-PUC products.
Comparison of Claimants and China brings another interesting result: while Chinese
elasticity is larger than Claimants elasticity for HS2 group, the reverse is observed for PUC
products. Chinese imports of PUC products are less sensitive to a change in price than are
Claimants’ imports. Considering Proposition (4) China’s defence of export restrictions as
a resource conservation policy is acceptable only if domestic demand elasticity is smaller
than foreign demand elasticity, which turns out to be the case based on the empirical
evidence when PUC are considered in aggregate.
Table 5: HS2 and HS6 PUC Import Elasticity for Claimants and China
Dep. Variable Claimants China
Imp.Quantity (log)a HS2 HS6 HS2 HS6
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Imp.Quantity (log) 0.210*** 0.200*** 0.096 0.208***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Unit value (log) -0.749*** -1.131*** -0.946*** -0.943***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Price Index (log) 0.828*** -47.880*** 0.133 -0.402
(0.22) (16.86) (0.09) (0.93)
GDP (log) 1.043*** 0.924*** 1.146*** 1.450***
(0.17) (0.13) (0.19) (0.29)
Observations 2038 1137 855 377
Groups 194 117 129 69
Instruments 77 80 77 65
Arell-Bond AR(2) p-value 0.99 0.23 0.28 0.65
Hansen Test p-value 0.26 0.84 0.99 0.64
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a GMM system Estimators, Estimates include year dummies.
So, does this negative difference in elasticities taken in absolute value which happens
to be significant, ̂ηd − ηw (0.943− 1.131), support the presence of a quota distortion given
the conclusions from the model?
From the first line of Table 4, we know ̂pd − pw positive. This is what we would expect
to support standard discrimination monopolist behaviour. Hence, when all PUC products
are taken together, the estimation of elasticity, given our hypothesis about the difference
in prices, illustrates the theoretical case (b) from Proposition (3) and Figure (1) of the
model. It provides no evidence of a distortionary effect of the Chinese export quota. To
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obtain more precise results, we consider a more disaggregated level of PUC products to
account for their very different weight in China’s exports and imports.
Per PUC product Estimates: We estimate import elasticity for each of the 21 PUC
products following Equation (22). Table 6 gives the coefficient ai,2 estimated from Equa-
tion (22) for each product using the Arellano and Bover (1998) estimator (GMM system)
in columns (1) and (3) and Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator in columns (2) and (4). The
Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator is used also in order to have a second estimation in
case the number of observations is insufficient to provide estimates from the system GMM
that pass the Hansen test. The Baltagi and Wu (1999) estimator is a feasible generalized
least squares handling unequally spaced panel data with autoregressive disturbances. The
full regression tables with test results for Claimants and for China are given in Appendix
(Tables B.5 and B.6). All significant coefficients are, as expected, negative.
Chinese import elasticities are most often larger in absolute value than import elastic-
ities of Claimants: two thirds of products exhibit a higher Chinese elasticity – column 5
indicates “+” for positive difference between Chinese elasticity and foreign elasticity both
taken in absolute value. Results per HS6 show that Chinese demand is more sensitive
than non-Chinese demand in 13 cases out of the 19 we were able to estimate. The last
column is deduced from Table 4. On average over 1995-2007, Chinese prices are higher
than foreign prices – then ̂pd − pw > 0 – for 13 products.
Results in Table 4 can be interpreted with regard to the theoretical results of Propo-
sition (3) and Figure (1) of the model on the impact of export restrictions on prices.
Let us start with the indisputable case of (a) where ̂ηd − ηw > 0. In this case the
model shows foreign prices are expected to be higher than domestic prices. The case (a) –
when columns 5 and 6 are filled (+/−) – applies only to four products of which two can be
considered equal elasticities (790111 and 790112).16 This result corresponds to a situation
where the export quota effect on prices enhances the monopolist’s price discrimination.
The case (b) supposes ηd−ηw < 0 and pd−pw > 0 which is found for two products (280469
and 810411). It corresponds to a situation where the quota effect on prices contradicts
the monopolist’s price discrimination without being strong enough to reverse the price
ranking given by discrimination. Hence there are six products that illustrate the standard
result of a discriminatory monopoly – 260200, Manganese ore; 810420, Magnesium Waste;
; 810411, Magnesium > 99 of which three – 280469, Silicon; 790111,Unwrought zinc > 99;
790112, Unwrought zinc< 99 – could as well be considered to display equal elasticities. The
monopoly price discrimination result has finally a minority occurrence in our estimations.
For those products, the export quota’s effect on price can only be suspected. There is no
16Sign for difference in elasticity for product 281700 is not clearcut given the contradictory results for
the two estimations results.
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evidence of a distortionary effect of the Chinese export quota.
Cases (c) and (d) suppose ηd−ηw < 0, but also a negative difference between domestic
price and foreign price because of the export quota effect on prices. This is observed
for three products: 260800, Zinc ores; 790200, Zinc waste; and 790120, Unwrought Zinc
alloys. China exports minimum amounts of these products, but it is a major producer and
a huge consumer of them.17 Here, comparison of price and elasticity differences is a clear
evidence that the export quota policy is not compatible with the resources conservation
argument.
The final empirical case is observed for the remaining products: ̂ηd − ηw > 0 and
pd − pw > 0. This unexpected case is found for ten products. For eight of them, China
is first world exporter. This situation of dominance is based on large disposal of resource
and a competitive export price. China is part of a small oligopoly scheme and does not
discriminate with respect to elasticity. There are three products for which we cannot draw
any conclusions.
All in all, results by HS6 allow us to conclude that the result for the whole PUC
aggregate is partly due to a composition effect. Although small the set of PUC products
displays heterogeneity regarding the impact of trade policy. The empirical results suggest
that when China is a major exporter, it does not discriminate according to demand elas-
ticity and we found no evidence of any quota distortion. On the other hand, when China
is a weak exporter and a major producer (as in the case of Zinc), our estimates support
the existence of a quota distortion in a monopoly pricing behaviour.
4 Conclusion
Trade partner discrimination was identified by the WTO Panel dealing with the China
– Raw Material dispute since the export restrictions were not “applied jointly with” a
restriction on the domestic production or consumption of the natural resources at stake.
Discrimination was acknowledged in this dispute on the basis that China’s trade pol-
icy gives asymmetric treatment of the domestic and foreign markets. The theoretical
and empirical economic analysis developed in this paper deals with price discrimination,
considering a monopoly extracting an exhaustible natural resource and selling it at two
different prices – on the domestic and foreign markets. The model throws light on the
consequences of an export quota on prices, resources extraction and welfare in this con-
text. Propositions 1 and 2 of the model confirm the expected result according to which
the export quota increases foreign prices relative to domestic prices and may lead to a
17China is the major producer and world’s biggest consumer in the world of Zinc. China consumes more
Zinc than the US, Japan, India, Germany, Italy and Belgium together. Note also that the difference in
prices is negative for Unwrought zinc > 99; 790112, Unwrought zinc< 99 for which the elasticity could be
considered equal.
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Table 6: Import Elasticities Estimates per HS6
CHINESE Elasticity CLAIMANTS Elasticity
HS6 ηˆd ηˆd ηˆf ηˆf
a ̂ηd − ηf ̂pd − pf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
250830 -0.936*** -1.072*** -0.650*** -0.869*** + +
252921 -1.440 -1.097*** -1.030*** -1.068*** +/ = +
252922 . 2.694 -1.058*** -1.356*** . +
260200 -2.325*** 0.299 -1.121*** -1.142*** + −
260600 -1.829*** -1.264 -0.970*** -1.094*** + +
260800 -0.906*** -0.551 -1.186*** -1.273** − −
262019 -1.494*** 17.766 -0.381*** -0.288** + +
262040 -1.281 -0.599 -0.600*** -0.810*** + +
270400 -1.694*** -1.107 -1.479*** -1.431*** + +
280469 -0.649*** -0.738*** -0.699*** -0.713*** −/ = +
280470 -1.539 -0.885*** -0.825*** -0.662** + +
281700 -0.824*** -1.297*** -0.850*** -0.995*** = /+ −
284920 -0.824*** -0.582 -0.647*** -0.499** + +
790111 -1.255*** -1.203*** -1.200*** -1.233*** +/ = −
790112 -1.271*** 0.429 -1.203*** -1.318*** +/ = −
790120 -0.658*** -0.964*** -0.935*** -0.955*** − −
790200 -0.189 -0.178 -0.750*** -0.872*** − −
810411 . -1.135*** -1.046*** -1.370*** − +
810419 -2.460 17.372* -0.561*** -0.641* + +
810420 -1.099 0.244 -0.079 -0.399*** + −
811100 -1.222*** -1.905** -1.038*** -0.951*** + +
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
(1) and (3) are fixed-effects estimations with autoregressive error; (2) and (4) are System
GMM estimations. Diagnostics of each regressions are provided in appendix.
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permanent superiority of the foreign price. In light of these results China’s trade pol-
icy can be considered strategic, as claimed by the US and the EU. Propositions 3 and 4
indicate less intuitive results. Interesting for the discussion on discrimination, when the
foreign demand elasticity is higher than the domestic demand elasticity, Proposition 3
shows that an export quota can, under certain conditions, reduce the monopolist’s equi-
librium price distortion pushing the two prices closer together around the optimal price.
This perspective, centred on economic efficacy, can be used as an argument to defend the
Chinese trade policy. Regarding resource extraction, the model challenges the idea that
an export quota always favours conservation of natural resource. Here, again, the relative
sizes of the demand elasticities are decisive. An export quota favours resource preservation
in the monopolist’s equilibrium only if domestic demand elasticity is smaller than foreign
demand elasticity. If not, Proposition (3) and Corollary (4) show that the monopolist
initially extracts more – and more rapidly, when constrained by an export quota. The
situation where the export quota is a conservation measure because domestic demand
elasticity is smaller than foreign demand elasticity, can be proposed to defend the Chinese
trade policy. This is revealed empirically by the aggregate estimation on PUC products.
This clearly advocates for the export quota to be considered conservation measure based
on the theoretical results of the model. But this result must be nuanced by the hetero-
geneity in relative elasticities when products are considered one at a time, and only one
third of them falls within the scheme of the aggregate elasticity. Concerning the distorting
effect of the export quota, we find differences by product, but it is possible to identify two
opposite cases. In the first, China is a major exporter and does not discriminate demand
according to elasticity. In this case no evidence of any export quota distortion on prices
can be found. In the second situation, China is a weak exporter but a major producer.
In this case the empirical results show the existence of price distortion, showing a price
discrimination and export quota distortion.
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A Proofs of Lemmas, propositions and corrolaries
A.1 Proof of Lemma (1)
Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004) show that under decision problems [P ] and [M ] prices
in both markets are rising over time at the interest rate. From conditions (6) and (7) we
can show that this result holds under decision problem [E]. Using the inverse demand
functions (2), the first order condition (6) in t = 0 can be written as pEd (0) = λ1
ηd
ηd−1 , so
that:
λ1 =
ηd − 1
ηd
pEd (0)
With this value of λ1, condition (6) can be written as (10): pEd (t) = e
rtpEd (0) . The
domestic price is thus rising at the interest rate.
The introduction of λ1 in condition (7) calculated using the inverse demand function
(2) in t = 0 shows that λ2 takes the following value:
λ2 =
ηf − 1
ηf
· pEf (0)−
ηd − 1
ηd
pEd (0)
With these values for λ1 and λ2, condition (7) can be written as (10): pEf (t) = e
rtpEf (0).
The foreign price is thus rising at the rate of interest.
A.2 Proof of Lemma (2)
The condition (7) can be written as:
e−rt · ηf − 1
ηf
· pEf (t) = λ1 + λ2
Condition (6) is satisfied at any time (and especially at the initial period t = 0)
implying (see demonstration of lemma 1) that λ1 = pEd (0) · ηd−1ηd . From Lemma (1) we
know that the prices pEd (t) rise at the interest rate over time. We can therefore write the
equation above as:
pEf (t) =
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
· pEd (t) + λ2ert
ηf
ηf − 1
A.3 Proof of the proposition (1)
Suppose that pEf (t) ≤ pMf (t), implying that qEf (t) ≥ qMf (t). From Lemma (2) and (13) the
inequality in price can be written as:
pEd (t) ·
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
+ λ2ert · ηf
ηf − 1 ≤
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
· pMd (t)
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So that:
λ2ert · ηf
ηf − 1 ≤
ηf
ηf − 1 ·
ηd − 1
ηd
· [pMd (t)− pEd (t)]
Since λ2ert · ηfηf−1 > 0, we should have pMd (t) − pEd (t) > 0, so that qMd (t) < qEd (t).
Since qMf (t) and q
M
d (t) satisfy the stock constraint, q
E
f (t) and q
E
d (t) would violate it if
qEf (t) ≥ qMf (t) and qMd (t) < qEd (t) were satisfied.
Suppose now that pEd (t) ≥ pMd (t), implying that qEd (t) ≤ qMd (t). From Lemma (2) and
(13) this inequality can be written as:
pEf (t) ·
ηf − 1
ηf
· ηd
ηd − 1 − λ2e
rt · ηd
ηd − 1 ≥
ηf − 1
ηf
· ηd
ηd − 1 · p
M
f (t)
So that:
λ2ert · ηd
ηd − 1 ≤
ηf − 1
ηf
· ηd
ηd − 1 ·
[
pEf (t)− pMf (t)
]
Since λ2ert · ηdηd−1 > 0, we should have pEf (t) − pMf (t) > 0, so that qEf (t) < qMf (t).
Since qMd (t) and q
M
f (t) satisfy the stock constraint, q
E
f (t) and q
E
d (t) would not bind it if
qEd (t) ≤ qMd (t) and qEf (t) < qMf (t) were satisfied.
Thus, the monopolist’s equilibrium under the export quota must be such that pEf (t) >
pMf (t) and p
E
d (t) < p
M
d (t)
A.4 Proof of the Corollary (1)
Proposition (1) states that the effect of an export quota is to raise the price with fewer
resource supplied on the foreign market and to decrease the price with more resource
supplied on the domestic market. The consumers on the foreign market (on the domestic
market) suffer (benefit) from this trade policy as a consequence.
A.5 Proof of the proposition (2)
The first order conditions of [E] indicate with (14) that: pEf (t) =
ηf
ηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
· pEd (t) +
λ2ert
ηf
ηf−1 . Two cases must be distinguished, depending on the relative size of the price
demand elasticities.
In the first case we have ηd > ηf > 1, so that
ηf
ηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
> 1. In this case (14)
indicates, since λ2ert
ηf
ηf−1 > 0, that p
E
f (t) > p
E
d (t).
In the second case we have ηf > ηd > 1, so that
ηf
ηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
< 1. In this case (14)
does not necessarily indicate that pEf (t) > p
E
d (t), since p
E
d (t) >
ηf
ηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
· pEd (t). In
order to get pEf (t) > p
E
d (t), we must have p
E
d (t) [
ηf
ηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
− 1] + λ2ert ηfηf−1 > 0. With
λ2 =
ηf−1
ηf
·pEf (0)− ηd−1ηd pEd (0) and the demands (1) expressed in t = 0, this condition can
be written as (15): qEf (0) < µf
(
qEd (0)
µd
) ηf
ηd
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A.6 Proof of Proposition (3)
We show first that the export quota deteriorates the inefficiency of the monopolist when
the domestic demand elasticity is greater than the foreign demand elasticity. We then
show that this result holds when foreign demand elasticity is greater than the domestic
demand elasticity only if conditions (16) are verified.
When ηd > ηf , (13) shows that the monopolist fixes discriminating prices such that
pMf (t) > p
M
d (t). In that case (represented in figure 1.a), we know that p
M
f (t) is larger than
and that pMd (t) is smaller than the optimal prices p
P (t) that a social planner would choose
in the same situation. From Proposition (1), we know that the effect of a quota on the
monopolist’s equilibrium is to raise the price on the foreign market and to lower the price
on the domestic market. As a consequence, the export quota exacerbates the inefficiency
of the monopolist’s equilibrium when ηd > ηf .
When ηf > ηd, (13) shows that the monopolist fixes discriminating prices such that
pMd (t) > p
M
f (t). In that case, we know furthermore that p
M
d (t) is larger than and p
M
f (t)
is smaller than the optimal prices pP (t) that a social planner would choose in the same
situation. From Proposition (1), we know that the effect of a quota on the monopolist’s
equilibrium is to raise the price on the foreign market and to lower the price on the
domestic market. As a consequence, the export quota exacerbates the inefficiency of the
monopolist’s equilibrium only if the increase in the foreign price and the decrease in the
domestic price it generates are sufficiently important to reach the following configuration:
pEd (t) < p
M
f (t) < p
P (t) < pMd (t) < p
E
f (t). In order to have p
E
f (t) > p
M
d (t) and p
E
d (t) <
pMf (t), (13) indicates that the two conditions (16) must be satisfied:
pEf (t) > p
M
f (t) · ηf−1ηf ·
ηd
ηd−1
pEd (t) < p
M
d (t) · ηfηf−1 ·
ηd−1
ηd
We can further show that when conditions (16) are satisfied, condition (15) of Propo-
sition (2) is satisfied too, but that the converse is not true. For that, note that introducing
(13) in conditions (16) permits to write: pEf (t) > p
M
d (t) and p
E
d (t) < p
M
f (t). when ηf > ηd,
we have pMf (t) < p
M
d (t) and therefore p
E
f (t) > p
E
d (t) so that (15) is verified. However (15)
can be satisfied with pEf (t) and p
E
d (t) such that conditions (16) are not met.
A.7 Proof of corollary (2)
Imposing an export quota reduces the monopolist’s equilibrium price distortion when
ηf > ηd and conditions (16) not satisfied. When pMf (t) < p
E
d (t) < p
E
f (t) < p
M
d , suppose
that pEd (t) = p
P (t) and pEf (t) > p
P (t). This would imply that qEd (t) = q
p
d(t) and q
E
f (t) <
qPf (t). Since q
P
d (t) and q
P
d (t) satisfy the stock constraint, q
E
d (t) and q
E
f (t) would not
bind it. By the same reasoning, if pEf (t) = p
P (t) and pEd (t) < p
P (t), qEd (t) and q
E
f (t)
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would violate the stock constraint. Thus, the monopolist’s equilibrium under an export
quota constraint must have higher prices than optimal on the foreign market and lower
prices than optimal on the domestic market. The same reasoning can be developed when
pMf (t) < p
E
f (t) < p
E
d (t) < p
M
d to show that we must have p
E
f (t) < p
P (t) and pP (t) < pEd (t).
A.8 Proof of Proposition (4)
The difference in the total initial extractions under [E] and [M ] can be expressed as
following:
QE0 −QM0 = rηdS +
(
1− ηdηf
)
qEf (0)− rηdS −
(
1− ηdηf
)
qMf (0)
=
(
1− ηdηf
) [
qEf (0)− qMf (0)
]
From proposition (1) we know that imposing a quota constraint reduces extraction for
export and raises supply in the domestic market, compared to the situation under [M ].
The initial extractions for the foreign market, therefore, are such that: qEf (0) < q
M
f (0).
As a consequence, QE0 −QM0 is positive when ηd > ηf and negative when ηf > ηd.
A.9 Proof of Corollary (3)
From proposition (4) we know that imposing an export quota increases (decreases) the
initial total extraction if the domestic demand elasticity is bigger (smaller) than the foreign
demand elasticity. From (11) we know that the rate of growth of the extraction paths
under [M ] and [E] is the interest rate. As the constraint on total extraction is always
verified, imposing an export quota implies the monopolist extracts more (less) rapidly if
the domestic demand elasticity is bigger (smaller) than the foreign demand elasticity.
B Additional Tables
B.1 Data
B.2 Average Share of Country Import 1995-2007 by products
B.3 Share of World Export of 15 first exporters 1995-2007
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Table B.1: Full HS2 Name
HS2 Name
25 SALT; SULPHUR; EARTHS AND STONE; PLASTERING MATERIALS, LIME AND CEMENT
26 ORES, SLAG AND ASH
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PRODUCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION;
BITUMINOUS SUBSTANCES; MINERAL WAXES
28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS; ORGANIC OR INORGANIC COMPOUNDS OF PRECIOUS METALS
OF RARE-EARTH METALS
79 ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF
81 OTHER BASE METALS; CERMETS; ARTICLES THEREOF
Table B.2: Product at HS2 level – Share of Country Import 1995-2007
HS2 Name EU15 US Japan China Germany France
25 SALT and SULPHUR 0.38 0.21 0.37 0.24 0.25 0.25
26 ORES, SLAG AND ASH 0.55 0.18 2.27 2.45 0.31 0.31
27 MINERAL FUELS and OILS 9.67 12.19 19.96 8.18 8.96 8.96
28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS 0.85 0.70 1.02 0.70 0.91 0.91
79 ZINC 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.11
81 OTHER BASE METALS 0.15 0.12 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.12
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2007.
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Table B.3: Product at HS6 level – Share of Country Import 1995-2007
HS6 Name EU15 US Japan China Germany France
250830 Fireclay 0.0030 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 0.0008
252921 Fluorspar< 97% 0.0015 0.0015 0.0068 0.0002 0.0013 0.0004
252922 Fluorspar> 97% 0.0025 0.0054 0.0076 0.0001 0.0053 0.0004
260200 Manganese 0.0062 0.0037 0.0333 0.0743 0.0009 0.0213
260600 Aluminium 0.0188 0.0321 0.0146 0.0115 0.0159 0.0194
260800 Zinc ores 0.0625 0.0060 0.0946 0.0733 0.0280 0.0516
262019 Slag with zinc 0.0046 0.0012 0.0030 0.0006 0.0015 0.0043
262040 Slag with aluminium 0.0032 0.0011 0.0013 0.0026 0.0057 0.0008
270400 Coke 0.0552 0.0364 0.0740 0.0006 0.1026 0.0478
280469 Silicon 0.0178 0.0170 0.0694 0.0046 0.0313 0.0086
280470 Phosphorus 0.0056 0.0015 0.0118 0.0002 0.0180 0.0017
281700 Zinc oxide & peroxide 0.0098 0.0084 0.0062 0.0078 0.0063 0.0077
284920 Carbides of Silicon 0.0081 0.0091 0.0174 0.0011 0.0140 0.0078
790111 Unwrought zinc> 99 0.0475 0.0749 0.0278 0.0338 0.0480 0.0224
790112 Unwrought zinc< 99 0.0236 0.0285 0.0074 0.0091 0.0200 0.0307
790120 Unwrought Zinc alloys 0.0166 0.0017 0.0032 0.0586 0.0218 0.0188
790200 Zinc waste 0.0042 0.0016 0.0005 0.0208 0.0034 0.0029
810411 Magnesium> 99 0.0076 0.0052 0.0199 0.0001 0.0085 0.0055
810419 Magnesium< 99 0.0055 0.0092 0.0060 0.0004 0.0074 0.0023
810420 Magnesium Waste 0.0008 0.0017 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010 0.0002
811100 Manganese 0.0054 0.0031 0.0206 0.0003 0.0082 0.0050
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2007.
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Table B.4: Rank and Share of the first 5 exporters by product over 1995-2009
HS6 First Second Third Fourth Fifth TOTAL 1-5
250830 Ukraine 0.34 China 0.29 USA 0.15 Germany 0.05 Kazakhstan 0.03 0.86
252921 China 0.26 Mexico 0.22 Mongolia 0.19 South. African CU 0.11 Morocco 0.06 0.84
252922 China 0.52 South. African CU 0.19 Mexico 0.08 Kenya 0.06 Morocco 0.04 0.9
260200 Australia 0.23 South. African CU 0.23 Gabon 0.21 Brazil 0.09 Ghana 0.07 0.83
260600 Guinea 0.32 Australia 0.15 Brazil 0.11 China 0.09 Jamaica 0.07 0.73
260800 Australia 0.18 Peru 0.17 USA 0.12 Canada 0.10 Bolivia 0.07 0.64
262019 Germany 0.20 Canada 0.14 Belgium 0.09 USA 0.06 Italy 0.05 0.54
262040 Germany 0.12 France 0.11 Belgium 0.11 USA 0.10 Canada 0.09 0.53
270400 China 0.36 Poland 0.15 Japan 0.08 Russian fed. 0.06 USA 0.04 0.69
280469 China 0.29 Norway 0.16 Brazil 0.15 Germany 0.07 France 0.05 0.73
280470 China 0.41 Netherlands 0.18 Germany 0.14 Kazakhstan 0.10 USA 0.06 0.9
281700 Germany 0.13 Netherlands 0.13 China 0.10 Canada 0.10 Belgium 0.05 0.51
284920 China 0.29 Norway 0.15 Germany 0.13 Japan 0.06 Netherlands 0.05 0.66
790111 Canada 0.15 China 0.11 Spain 0.08 Australia 0.06 Korea. rep. 0.06 0.46
790112 Canada 0.16 Kazakhstan 0.08 Australia 0.07 Russian fed. 0.07 Finland 0.06 0.45
790120 Belgium 0.26 Australia 0.18 Germany 0.06 Hong kong 0.05 Korea. rep. 0.05 0.6
790200 Germany 0.15 France 0.14 USA 0.09 Belgium 0.08 Netherlands 0.08 0.55
810411 China 0.45 Russian fed. 0.13 Israel 0.10 Canada 0.06 USA 0.06 0.81
810419 China 0.24 Canada 0.21 Norway 0.10 Russian fed. 0.08 Israel 0.07 0.69
810420 USA 0.21 Canada 0.19 Germany 0.15 Italy 0.06 China 0.05 0.66
811100 China 0.51 South. African CU 0.17 Germany 0.07 Ukraine 0.04 Netherlands 0.03 0.83
Source: BACI-CEPII, 1995-2009.
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